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1. UNDERSTANDING THE MARKET
The Colombian real estate market has been dynamic for the 
past 12 years.  Commercial real estate has expanded as 
GDP grew at a 4% rate until 2014, 3% in 2015, and 1% in 
2016 (Banco de la Republica, 2016).  The slow but steady 
economic growth (Srini, 2017) has strengthened the case 
for Colombia as a good alternative among other emerging 
markets.  Recent social and political events, such as the 
peace treaty with Colombia’s oldest rebel group, suggest 
that this could be the right time to invest. 
The real estate market has been active on several fronts. 
The hospitality industry has expanded with the major hotel 
chains in the principal cities (Procolombia, 2014).  The 
logistics sector has also had some growth, taking relative 
advantage of Colombia’s strategic geographical location 
(Procolombia, 2014).  Colombia has access to both Pacific 
and Atlantic Ocean ports and is at the midpoint of the 
Americas.  This asset class will have room to grow further 
as Colombia’s infrastructure matures.  Retail has grown 
through shopping centers in large and some intermediate 
cities.  A total of 12 new centers opened between 2015 and 
2016 (El Tiempo, 2015). 
Colombia’s housing market presents shortage in quantity 
and quality across the board (DANE, 2015).  Important 
efforts have been made to close the gap.  Developers have 
put in place an average of 230,000 new units of housing 
each year since 2013 (Revista Dinero, 2015), but the 
rate of growth is decreasing.  The primary reason for the 
low building rate of 6 units per 1,000 inhabitants (Revista 
Dinero, 2015) is correlated to the government’s effort to 
build 100,000 houses.  The initiative aimed to give housing 
free of charge to the most vulnerable sector of society 
(Ministerio de Vivienda, n.d.).  This program comes as 
other government-funded programs were aimed to support 
the qualified first-time buyer.  A subsidized interest rate and 
reduction of down payment are the two common forms of 
government support still in effect today.  
Housing has the greatest opportunity for investment 
and long-term growth.  The market size and the lack of 
capacity for ownership make rental properties an untapped 
opportunity, ensuring stable cash flows after development. 
Developers have focused on primary markets (Bogotá, 
Medellin, Cartagena, and Cali) and only recently have turned 
to emerging cities like Popayan, Villavicencio, Neiva, Santa 
Marta, and Valledupar (Revista Dinero, 2015).  The housing 
serves the top and the bottom tier of the socioeconomic 
spectrum, leaving a 4 million home deficit in the middle 
class and lower middle class. 
Colombia’s population is 48 million people, 70% of whom 
are urban dwellers (World Bank, n.d.) with 35% of this urban 
population living in rental properties (Revista Dinero, 2016). 
Statistics show that only Santo Domingo and Quito in Latin 
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Figure 2: GDP per capita. Colombia’s GDP growth has been slow 
but increasing since 1999. Colombia’s economic policy has been 
historically conservative being more resilient to external phenomena. 
Source: World Bank, Brito, J.(2018). 
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Figure 4: Paloquemao. Example of traditional low-income housing in 
Bogotá. The free houses offered today resemble this model, normally 
a five-story walkup building with some space for amenities. Source: 
Pardo,J. (2018)
Figure 3: Home Deficit. In 2005 the estimated need was 3.8 million 
homes. The division is presented in regions. The major deficit is in the 
biggest regions and trends down as the regions get smaller. Source: 
Dane data.Brito, J. (2017).
American have this percentage of renters (Ramos, 2015). 
Renters include everyone from the blue-collar workers to 
the upper-middle class.  The market includes 34% of the 
total population earns one “minimum monthly wage” ($230 
USD), and 29% that earns around $460 USD to $690USD. 
Another 15% earns between $920 USD to $1,380 USD 
(Finanzas Personales, n.d.).  The remaining 22% comprise 
the extremes.  The Minimum Wage (SMLV) is established 
every year by mutual consent of the labor unions and the 
business associations mediated by the government.  About 
6% earn above the described brackets and 16% earn below. 
This is the segment of the population that has received the 
most attention in residential development. 
An estimated 78% of the population—mostly blue collar, 
lower middle class, and middle class—faces difficulty 
entering the financial system due to their income and/or 
the nature of their labor contracts, putting them outside the 
range of eligibility for major housing subsidies and limiting 
the possibility to obtain a home mortgage from a private 
institution.
The mortgage system is a pivotal feature in home buying. 
To understand an investment opportunity in the Colombian 
housing market today, it is necessary to understand the 
evolution of the housing policies, the development plans, 
and the mortgage system.
2. DEVELOPMENT PLANS, ZONING, AND HOUSING 
POLICIES
Colombia’s general development plan has its roots in the 
1960s.  Latin American countries had united around the 
Alliance for Progress (Gonzales, 1994).  This alliance was 
designed by the administration led by U.S. President John 
F. Kennedy to align the economic interest of his country with 
those of Latin American countries.  Some of the important 
aspects of the alliance were palns to aim for more equitable 
income distribution, land reform, and economic and social 
planning (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, n.d.). 
Urbanization trends, slow economic growth, and violence 
in some regions led rural residents to move to cities looking 
for better opportunities.  The urban sprawl and the failure 
to realize the benefits of the proposed US political and 
economic interventions led the Latin American countries 
to build their own agendas.  The Latin American Institute 
of Social and Economic Planning (ILPES), formed in 1962, 
provided the blueprint for Latin American city development. 
Figure 5: Bogotá’s Oil Spill Growth. Bogotá’s “oil spill” growth shows 
the rapid and uncontrollable urban sprawl. Decades of poor planning 
and political problems lead to population gathering among the outer 
rings of the city and, more recently to the periphery. Source: Brito,J. 
(2018).
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In the 1960s, Colombia’s farmers were unable to sell 
their goods in the international markets.  The upsurge 
of the war between the two political parties (Liberal and 
Conservative) and the formation of different rebel groups 
fueled a mass migration of people to the cities.  Bogotá, for 
example, grew from 715,250 people in 1950 to 1,697,311 
people in 1960 and 2,855,065 people in 1970 (Instituto de 
Estudios Urbanos, 2017).  Before 1990, Colombia based its 
development plans on the opinion of experts from around 
the world, but with no systematic governmental approach 
towards development and growth.  The country grew rapidly 
but with no clear direction (Gonzales, 1994).
Colombia developed a new government-sponsored 
development plan with the new 1991 Constitution.  The 
new framework set out the basis for 9-year development 
plans made by every state (Congreso de Colombia, 1994). 
This gave the people initiating the development plans three 
government terms to execute and revise their schemes.  It 
is important to note that the word “revision” is included in 
the constitution. It indicates that there is the constitutional 
guarantee that the plans adapt but not change completely 
in every 9-year period.  The contradiction arises when 
developments that span for longer periods, infrastructure 
for example, end up competing with the 4-year presidential 
tenure. Every new president sets the educational, 
institutional, development, and infrastructure goals that 
are modified based on the elected official political agenda. 
This has created a conflict between the country’s plans 
and the development of cities. Development becomes 
a political instrument for future governors, mayors, and 
presidential candidates. Housing becomes a very valuable 
commodity to attract voters. 
3. HISTORY OF THE MORTGAGE SYSTEM  
Although the general details of the entire financial system 
are beyond the scope of this paper, it is necessary to review 
briefly the mortgage system since the 1950s until the 1980s, 
when the current system was set in place.  The modern 
mortgage system in Colombia should be understood 
through the eyes of one institution, the Central Mortgage 
Bank (BCH).
Colombia’s mortgage system was born in 1926, funded by 
foreign capital and put in place by a few financial institutions 
(Urrutia & Namen, 2010).  This mortgage system had a 
short life span as their dependency on foreign capital made 
it vulnerable to the 1929 financial crisis.  The financial 
institutions went bankrupt after 1930.  Through a 1932 
decree, the central government created the Agrarian Credit 
Savings Bank1 and the Central Mortgage Bank (BCH)2 
(Urrutia & Namen, 2010).  The BCH was the only institution 
funded by the government willing to lend for a 10-year 
period, something not present in the financial system of 
the time.  By 1972 the BCH was the leading home lending 
institution for all types of projects.  The bank helped put in 
place 756,363 homes in Bogotá before 1993.   
In 1972 the Colombian banking system decided to switch 
its currency adjustment mechanism (monetary policy) 
to the Constant Acquisition Power Unit (UPAC)3.  This 
mechanism aimed to adjust money against CPI4 so it would 
not lose face value with inflation and time.  This change 
also reinforced the idea that people would be encouraged 
1  Caja de Crédito Agrario
2  Banco Central Hipotecario – Central Mortgage Bank
3  Unidad de Poder Adquisitivo Constante
4  Consumer Price Index
Figure 6: Ciudadela Colsubsidio. Colsubsidio housing complex. Designed in 1980 by architect German Samper. This 140,000-housing unit devel-
opment was sponsored by a worker’s compensation fund and built in Bogotá. This project set the trend for the ‘80s and ‘90s in urban develop-
ments tackling affordability and quality. Source: Fabra,S. (2014).
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to save more money, and this would maintain the liquidity of 
the financial system. 
In 1974, the new government started to rethink the adjusting 
mechanism and decided to change to Fixed Term Deposits 
(FTD)5 (Banco de la Republica).  This change proved to 
be detrimental for the BCH and the mortgage system.  CPI 
correction was aligned with the users’ purchasing power, 
but the FTD correction was adjusted by the financial system 
and did not consider the CPI.  During this period, Colombia 
had an inflation rate of about 20% that directly affected 
directly the CPI; the new correction method was linked 
through Fixed Term Deposits that soared higher than CPI at 
the same time.  This mismatch in the adjusting mechanism 
caused loan amounts to double or triple, making the 
payments higher and ultimately causing a mass default.  
In 1999, the constitutional court determined the refinancing 
practices of the BCH were illegal and the government had 
to intervene.  The court stated that due to the change in the 
adjusting mechanism, it was impossible for users to repay 
their debts and this contravened the constitution (Urrutia & 
Namen, 2010).  This caused private financial institutions to 
step in to fill the gap and become the primary source for 
mortgage lending in the country. 
4. THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM TODAY
The private lending institutions took over the mortgage 
lending system and started to work closely with the 
government to incentivize home ownership.  The new 
1991 government adopted a free market economic policy 
that caused an inflow of funds from international markets. 
Independent financial institutions started lending more 
mortgage money and loans grew a staggering 165% 
between 1990 and 1997 (Urrutia & Namen, 2010).  Mortgage 
lending abruptly stopped in 1999 when the real estate 
bubble burst.  Foreign capital withdrew and the oversupply 
of space was unable to be absorbed.  This crash caused 
mortgage lending to stop almost completely until 2005.  The 
reactivation of lending in 2005 was spearheaded by private 
banks through conventional loans (Urrutia & Namen, 2010). 
A new period of financial prosperity began in 2005 
and continued until 2009 when another financial crisis 
occurred.  By early 2009, the government was interested 
in helping finance housing and construction since this was 
the traditional way to maintain economic growth and be 
countercyclical to the economic crisis.  The government 
5  Depósito de Tasa Fija
promoted a subsidy system, still in place today, helping 
potential owners by subsidizing monthly payment for the 
first 7 years of a home loan.  The subsidy can amount to up 
to 5% of the loan interest.  This makes the mortgage system 
viable for many families.  
In recent years the subsidy has gone to 0% down payment 
and included a free housing initiative.  Both programs are 
politically popular but often encourage economic downfall. 
The 0% down payment has systematically increased default 
rates amongst a population that does not have the financial 
stability to make monthly payments (Urrutia & Namen, 
2010).  The free housing initiative presents the same 
problem as people who have absolutely no means and are 
now forced to pay housing taxes and basic utilities (water, 
electricity, gas).  They are forced to rent out the property, 
which is illegal, or have had to forgo the property. 
5. MARKET DYNAMIC AND SIZE
The primary source of information to understand the 
mortgage system dynamic in Colombia is the National 
Department of Statistics (DANE)6.  DANE provides a 
quarterly report on the mortgages and tracks the delinquency 
rates for those loans, number of homes financed, and 
construction statistics. 
In 2016, 30,368 homes are subject to financing.  This 
includes both social housing and the private housing sector 
(VIS and NO VIS7).  Splitting 60%-40% between new and 
used, the financial system has deployed around $550 
million USD on housing loans in the second quarter of2017. 
Metrics for the second quarter of 2017 show that 14,564 NO 
VIS homes have been financed with $423 million USD.  By 
comparison, VIS loans account for 15,822 homes and US 
$127 million USD. 
The most recent DANE report also follows the mortgages 
in a four-year period, from the first quarter of 2013 to the 
fourth quarter of 2017.  The first important metric is that the 
mortgage system has grown by 3% from the first quarter of 
2013 until the first quarter of 2017.  Approximately $12.2 
billion USD is commited to the mortgages in the first quarter 
of 2013; as of fourth quarter 2016, there are about $18 billion 
6  Departamento Nacional de Estadistica
7  VIS stands for Social Housing. Social Housing has specific 
rules around size and price. Anything that does not fit into the criteria 
established by the government, is not legible to receive financial benefits 
from the government.NO VIS would comprise any housing not covered 
by the specific VIS rules and benefits, but could still be part of certain 
government-oriented policies such as subsidies to the interest rate
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USD.  Separating the mortgages by housing type (VIS/NO 
VIS)8 the growth in both types of development has been 
3%.  Still, the amount of mortgage backing for VIS is much 
smaller than the number for NO VIS.  The numbers show 
that VIS mortgage only accounts for 30% of all outstanding 
mortgages. 
Private credit institutions account for the greatest number 
of loans.  These institutions accounts are 83.4% of all 
loans originated in the first quarter of 2017.  The next 
biggest player would be Nacional Savings Fund9 with 
10.6%.  It is evident that the market relies very heavily on 
private institutions.  This dependency opens the door for 
alternative funding of projects and, looking at this through 
a conventional capital stack, the Colombian market lacks 
subordinate and mezzanine debt lenders that take an active 
role in the real estate development process. 
The delinquency rate is tracked through DANE records. 
In Colombia, the delinquency rate is measured by first 
payment delinquency, and shows a consistent 2% to 3% 
during a four-year span.  This is consistent with Colombia’s 
conservative economic policies and financial institutions. 
High entry barriers and high interest rates might be reasons 
why delinquency rates are so low.  On the other hand, this 
conservatism and high entry barrier has helped Colombia 
withstand global economic fluctuations better than other 
countries in the region.  The national growth rate of about 
5% to 8% has been consistent for the last four presidential 
terms and has been resilient to global macroeconomic 
factors such as the 2010 financial crisis. 
The loans are originated in the major cities and metropolitan 
areas. Bogotá accounts for 42.2%, Antioquia for 12.3%, and 
Valle del Cauca for 8.1%.  These three have the biggest 
population centers in the country (Bogotá, Medellin, and 
Cali) and represent the main sources of production.  Bogotá 
as the financial center, Medellin as manufacturing hub, 
and Cali as the major agribusiness hub directly exported 
through the Buenaventura Port.  All other mid-size regions 
account for less than 5% each.  This helps understand the 
concentration in the Colombian real estate market.  The 
midsize regions receive little attention because the capital 
and the bulk of the housing need is found elsewhere.  The 
8  IBID. 
9  The FNA is the institution created by the government to man-
age the severance of all legal workers. Every month, employers withhold 
a percentage of the employee’s salary and deposit it to the FNA account. 
The money can only be withdrawn if the employee is going to buy/fix a 
house or pursue an education in an institution of higher learning. 
delinquency rates are higher in Bogotá and scale down as 
the amount of loans deployed get smaller. 
DANE also indicates the pipeline of new projects. Looking at 
a study for the years 2012-2017, we can understand better 
the number of units added and the dynamics between VIS 
and NO VIS housing becomes clearer.  
The most insightful metric is the project pipeline for VIS and 
NO VIS homes.  The VIS housing supply has an average 
annual variation of -4.2% since 2012.  During the same 
period, the NO VIS supply has an annual variation of +5.5%. 
This metric suggests two things.  First, the housing shortage 
for the lowest income population has been systematic and 
will continue to expand if the government halts the cash flow 
or the incentives to developers.  Second, the extremely high 
entry barrier of the banking system has completely isolated 
the segment of the population that needs to finance its 
housing needs.  The dissolution of the Central Mortgage 
Bank in the 1990s expanded the shortage of lower and 
lower middle-class development projects, not fully serviced 
by government incentives or financial institutions. 
On the other hand, developers have found niche markets, 
especially for the upper middle and high-class individuals, 
who are able to bypass the high entry barrier of the financial 
system and become homeowners.  The first quarter of 
2017 statistics show 3,460 million square meters (11 million 
square feet) being built in the VIS market and 17,487 million 
square meters (574 million square feet) being built for NO 
VIS housing.  These numbers translate to NO VIS building 
representing 68.5% of new supply.  Looking further it is 
clear that the 2016 distribution of the loans against building 
permits approved indicate that 39% of new housing permits 
are for low and low-low socioeconomic status that fit into the 
VIS category.  It is important to note that 22% of permits are 
for lower middle class, 22% for middle class, and 17% for 
upper middle class and high class (DANE, 2016). 
The market is highly segmented on the two opposite sides of 
the spectrum.  On the one hand, higher income individuals 
have found a market to obtain their first home and, in many 
cases, rental properties.  On the other side of the spectrum, 
extremely low-income residents have been awarded free 
housing through programs that have proven inadequate 
both socially and economically.  The middle class, especially 
lower middle class, has gotten less development during 
these years.  This demographic constitutes about 13.8 
million people in middle class and 16.5 million in the lower 
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middle class (Finanzas Ya, 2016).  Currently, about 3 out of 
every 10 people live in rental properties (Torres, 2012) and 
earn between 1.5 and 2.5 times the minimum wages10.The 
household size is approximately 3 people per household, 
but it is not consistant through the county and varies from 
region to region.
6. CONSTRAINTS FOR DEVELOPERS
Like the constraints for the potential home buyers, the 
developers in Colombia have very high entry barriers to 
finance almost any type of development.  The development 
model centers on conventional bank loans and selling 
of units instead of renting them. Condo development, as 
defined by the US market, is the most common alternative 
for developers. 
Developers start with a parcel of land that belongs to the 
development entity and have done the entire permitting 
process before units are offered.  This means that the 
competent authorities have validated the design of the 
building or buildings, have acknowledged the structural 
design as compliant, and have cleared zoning limitations 
after having suggested changes to the original design to 
comply with current laws and regulations.  The process also 
involves the acknowledgment of entitlement and availability 
of basic utilities.  It is important to understand that this 
process does not involve the community in any way. 
At the beginning of sales, the developer partners with two 
possible entities:  welfare funds and/or financial institution. 
Financial institutions will back up the deal in two ways:  as a 
fiduciary agent and as a construction lender.  The bank as a 
fiduciary agent is a system put in place by the end of 1990 
aimed to protect home buyers from investing in projects 
that could potentially fail (Medina Vargas & Vasquez Torres, 
2014).  Developers, before the law, could start construction 
with just a few units worth of sales and no financial backup 
to finish the entire project.  Developers would aim to 
continue sales after starting to successfully complete the 
building.  When the project became financially distressed, 
construction stopped and no cash was left to return to the 
original investors.  The remaining asset to foreclose was 
an incomplete building, with limited salvage value, leaving 
investors empty handed.  
Currently, the developer may only start the construction 
10  Colombia has SMLV which stands for Current Minimum Legal 
Wage. It is set annually through the negotiation of the unions and the 
industrial sector and is mediated by the government. Currently, the SMLV 
is set at about $250 dollars a month.  
process if he has the complete amount to finish the project 
and the construction loan has been deployed (Medina 
Vargas & Vasquez Torres, 2014).  The threshold is put in 
place to ensure that the asset will be completely built.  
This process often forces developers to access loans 
through personal guarantees to the bank and has the 
additional constrain of having to sell units before he can 
even begin construction.  This is the primary reason that 
there is very little development for rent, in what in the US 
market is referred to as apartment buildings.  Hence, the 
capital stack in Colombia is very limited.  There is a senior 
loan followed by equity.  The senior debt is primarily done 
by financial institutions.  The pension funds are not direct 
players in the capital stack.  Their allocation has been limited 
by government and is roughly divided into 36% public debt, 
24% foreign stock market, 17% local stock market, 11% local 
debt market, 6% private funds, 3% foreign private debt, and 
3% at free will (Buitrago, n.d.).  Only in recent years have 
some foreign investors stepped in and contributed financing 
mechanism but without a holistic approach regarding 
capital allocations from foreign capital.   This limits most 
developers, unable to find alternative financing methods. 
Finally, it is important to understand that in a condo 
oriented market, there is a lack of operators.  This will be 
further explored in the next section, but the lack of market 
for apartment buildings has inherently caused a lack of 
companies doing property and asset management.   
7. REITS:  AN ALTERNATIVE TO FOSTER CHANGE
Proposing alternatives to foster new and better development 
is a critical part of this paper.  As mentioned before, the 
constraints for both the potential home buyers and for the 
developers of these products indicate that there is a need 
for new incentives.  An alternative to consider are REITs, 
which have been successful in the US, allowing people 
to efficiently and easily diversify their portfolios with real 
estate.  In recent years, the implementation of REITs in 
Mexico (FIBRAs) have capitalized more than $13 billion 
USD (Martinez, 2017). 
The Colombian context has offered similar alternatives 
throughout the years.  Trusts, Real Estate Mutual Funds, 
Mezzanine Debt Fund, International Fiduciary Right 
(FIDI)11, Collective Real Estate Investment Fund (FICI)12, 
11  Figura Internacional de Derecho Fiduciario (FIDI)
12  Fondo de Inversion Colectiva Inmobiliario (FICI)
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and Private Capital Real Estate Funds (FCP-I)13 are 
products offered for individuals and institutional investors 
to invest in commercial real estate through a private equity 
structure.  The legal framework for FCP and FICI is in Decree 
2142/13, Trusts are regulated by the commercial code, and 
mutual funds were established by law in 2003 (Congreso de 
Colombia, 2017).  The complexity in structuring, regulations, 
and different stakeholders have provided equity to less 
sophisticated developers. 
The two most relevant investment vehicles would be the 
Real Estate Investment Funds, FICI and FCP.  The FCP 
is limited to professional and institutional investors with a 
minimum investment amount of 600 times Minimum Monthly 
Wage (SMLV)14, around $150,000.  Investors gather funds 
and evaluate an offering presented by the developer-partner 
as a bundle.  This could be land, buildings or debt that 
cannot be individually selected by the investors.  They buy, 
hold and sell the investments according to the investment 
vehicle rules and regulations set upon with the structuring 
entity and, at disposition of the assets, equity is distributed 
through an equity waterfall.  Upon returns on investments, 
taxation law allows for the original investment to be tax free 
and earnings will be charged with 39% capital gains tax 
(Cortes & De Bedout, 2016). 
The FICI Structure is similar to the FCP structure with 
regards of the applicable law and the opportunity to invest 
in both equity and debt.  The difference is that FICI are 
funds also aimed at individual investors, with no minimum 
investment amount, and with the obligation of investing 
75% of their equity on real estate related activities.  The 
tax benefits are less appealing for the individual investor. 
After equity is distributed through the waterfall, original 
equity and earnings are taxed at 39%.  It is important to 
understand that both FICI and FCP could be introduced to 
the stock exchange and be traded in it but only a hand full 
have attempted this (Cortes & De Bedout, 2016).
The funds have focused primarily in industrial properties, 
shopping malls, condo sales, and land ownership but 
are not active in the rental housing market (Cortes & De 
Bedout, 2016) (NAREIT, n.d.).  Even though these funds 
sell themselves as REITs, the truth is that they are far 
from offering the financial benefits that a REIT offers.  The 
long holding periods directly affect the liquidity of the fund, 
the investors cannot actively trade and the funds are not 
13  Fondos de Capital Privado Inmobiliario (FCP-I)
14  Salario Minimo Legal Vigente (SMLV)
benefited by consistent capital injections.  The market needs 
to offer a dynamic investment vehicle that can quickly, and 
in a less restrictive manner, allocate funds where the market 
needs and on the property type that will produce the highest 
returns.  REITs will offer a better solution for a growing 
market, with high occupancy rates and with good market 
fundamentals. 
8. STRUCTURING GROWTH
REITs offer a well-rounded investment vehicle that can allow 
for different institutional investment as well as a new offering 
in the stock market. REIT structure ensures 75% of funds 
will be allocated into real estate projects and will ensure 
liquidity to all asset classes.  Furthermore, distributing 90% 
of its earnings will incentivize allocations from investors 
unwilling to tie capital for several years before they receive 
profits (NAREIT, n.d.).  The model is attractive for both 
institutional and individual investors since earnings are 
recaptured without selling shares. 
The REITs have a less restrictive allocation criteria, 
different from the current fund structures that limit the way 
the management company decides when, where, and how 
to invest.  The less constrained investment criteria can 
improve funding in all real estate asset classes and improve 
market dynamics.  REITs will have the ability to strategically 
allocate investments in, for example, smaller developments 
in alternative markets that would have not been able to 
access bank loans or appear in the investment portfolio 
offered to a fund. 
These funds will also have the chance to offer different 
interest rates when lending, competing with the rates of 
banks and improving the financial alternatives for all.  Value-
add developers, currently not very active in the market, will 
find new lending opportunities either with mezzanine debt 
or loans to reposition assets.  All these improved market 
dynamics will also encourage companies to operate the 
assets to ensure consistent cash flow, critical for REITs 
and their commitment to stock holders.  Finally, taxation 
structure for the REIT and the distributed earning will be a 
tipping point.  No corporate taxes to the REIT and no capital 
gains tax from distributed earning can prove instrumental to 
all investors. 
9. CHALLENGES
REITs in Colombia will face several challenges in their 
implementation.  One possible challenge will be that the 
Colombian market will offer a limited availability of asset, 
property and portfolio managers that can properly operate 
70
residential rental properties.  There will be a need to import 
foreign know-how or pivot current hotel asset and property 
managers into residential management.  Another potential 
challenge will be on the ability to provide liquidity to work 
force housing developments, identified previously as the 
population segment with the largest potential demand for 
rental housing. Structuring tax incentives such as Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) is an interesting 
opportunity, already present in the US Market. This structure 
would incentivize developers to build and eventually sell the 
tax credit to larger institutions contributing to the overall 
market dynamic. 
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